Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism are two concepts popular in contemporary scholarly and journalistic discourses. Both of them lack a universally accepted definition and have been contested in the literature. Transnationalism was originally connected to recent immigrant cohorts, although the concept has been expanded to include other groups of people, as well as a whole array of activities across borders. Cosmopolitanism has been used as a new moral and ethnic standpoint suitable for 21st-century global life; but it has also been criticized as a manifestation of the mentality of the upper and middle classes (Featherstone, 2002). The increasing strength of transnational connections raises the issues explored in this essay: does transnationalism lead to greater levels of cosmopolitanism? Is localism a negation of both of these processes? Contemporary discussions on these topics often seem to suggest an affirmative answer to these questions.

This essay is a contribution towards gaining conceptual clarity with regard to the task of conceptualizing (and distinguishing between) transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. My argument is that the transnational experience should be conceived as involving several layers ranging from the construction of transnational social spaces to the formation of transnational communities. Hence, transnationalism's relationship to cosmopolitanism is less straightforward than what it might seem at first glance. The reality of internal globalization (or glocalization) is responsible for the transformation of people's everyday lives irrespective of whether they are transnational or not. Glocalization leads to two different versions of cosmopolitanism: first, a thick or rooted or situational cosmopolitanism and, second, a thin cosmopolitanism, whereby detachment allows for transcending the boundaries of one's culture or locale. I argue in favour of this second version and develop an operationalization of the cosmopolitan–local continuum in terms of different degrees of attachment to cultures, locales and regions.
The significance of global interconnectedness as an important component for 21st-century social sciences has been broadly recognized in the literature (Castells, 1996; Beck, 1999, 2000a; Tomasci, 2001; Albow, 1997; Held et al., 1999). Globalization promotes the creation of transnational social spaces and reconfigures the sociologists' object of enquiry – hitherto conceived as the institution of national society. However, the consequences of increased mobility are markedly different between the 'first world' of the middle and upper classes in the advanced industrialized countries and the 'second world' of the working or middle classes in the mostly peripheral societies that make up the majority of the world's population.

Bauman (1998) seizes upon the images of the tourist and the vagabond in order to highlight the manner in which social mobility across borders acts as a new form of social or cultural capital that enshrines new divisions among classes and individuals. He sums it up in the following slogan: 'Green light for the tourists, red light for the vagabonds' (Bauman, 1998: 93). The theoretical expression of this slogan is to be found in the contemporary designations of people as cosmopolitan or transnational. In contemporary discourse, Hannerz's (1990: 239) description of cosmopolitanism as 'an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness towards divergent cultural experiences' is understood as the property of those individuals who possess sufficient reflexive cultural competencies that enable them to manoeuvre within new meaning systems. Ordinary folk – ranging from migrant workers to exiles or refugees – do not necessarily possess such cultural and intellectual predispositions (Nava, 2002: 88). The members of this latter group are 'people out of place', that is, transnational people. In contrast, Werbner (1999) argues that even working-class immigrants are capable of producing and expressing 'working class cosmopolitanism', an interpretation that directly challenges the theoretical links among transnational mobility, class and cosmopolitanism.

All of this strongly suggests the necessity for clearly describing the connection between cosmopolitanism and transnationalism. These concepts are applied and decoded with reference to specific groups of people, thereby signifying not just a social reality, but also an association between class, status and race or ethnicity, on the one hand, and linguistic use, on the other. As Milan Kundera (2002) suggests, the labels of 'transnational' and 'cosmopolitan' are far from innocent descriptions of an actual situation. On the contrary, national origin and cultural tradition play a critical role in the assignment of these labels. The disjunction between image and reality that lies beneath the layperson's judgement about who looks like a 'cosmopolitan' vs who looks like a 'transnational' or 'transmigrant' reveals an
unwanted yet all too apparent complexity – and it is this complexity I wish to explore here. Acting as labels, these terms are employed selectively with regard to people of different classes as well as different racial and ethnic backgrounds.3

Contemporary discourse on transnationalism and cosmopolitanism suffers from these spatially and culturally specific stereotypes that colour our imagination and limit our grasp of these terms. Transnationalism emerged in the 1990s as a new concept aiming to describe the situation of relatively recent immigrant cohorts – mostly immigrants from Central America – entering into the labour force and the social fabric of advanced industrial societies in North America and Western Europe (see Basch et al., 1994; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Glick Schiller and Fourton, 2001; Portes et al., 1999). These immigrants called into question the conventional racial categories of ‘black’ and ‘white’ in dominant (mostly US-based) discourse, and the label of ‘transnational’ provided them with an alternative category (see Dominguez, 1998).

Upon more serious reflection, scholarship gradually recognized that transnationalism is not a phenomenon with a history of only a few decades – and perhaps the weakest argument of all is one that would reduce transnationalism to a mere appendix of contemporary technological changes (for discussions, see Roudometof, 2000; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002). Even in the US, transnational feelings and ties played an important role in the lives and organizations of pre-1950 immigrant communities. Therefore, the issue contemporary research confronts today is no longer justifying the novelty of transnationalism (although a more historically oriented gaze greatly enhances our understanding). Rather, the issue is the extent to which the transnational label should be exclusively applied to contemporary international migration.4

Over the last decade, the label has been extended to the capitalist class (Sklair, 2001), but also to numerous other areas of enquiry, including activism across borders, religious communities and social movements – to name just a few (for examples, see Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Smith et al., 1997; van der Veer, 2002; and the essays in Kennedy and Roudometof, 2002). In his presidential address to the XV World Congress of Sociology, Martinelli (2003: 294) mentions the ‘increasing power of economic and financial transnational actors’ as one of the key factors that render contemporary globalization ‘a qualitatively different process’.

If this is the case, then, it is necessary to theorize transnationalism as a qualitatively distinct concept, independent from its past association with specific subfields (like that of international migration). In fact, Beck’s (2000b, 2001, 2002) contributions provide a welcome extension of the concept, but, as the discussion in following sections of this essay show, they are far from unproblematic.
Unpacking Cosmopolitanism: Ideal vs Reality

There is not a uniform interpretation of cosmopolitanism in the literature. While for some, cosmopolitanism holds out the prospect of global democratization and the decentring of the values, attitudes and lifestyles associated with the nation-state, for others, the term expresses the very inability of upper and middle classes to assume their responsibility towards the ‘silent majority’ of those excluded from their wealth and privilege (Featherstone, 2002: 1). The term can be applied to several different research sites, including cities and their cultural milieus, religions, individual attitudes and philosophical or ideological or ethical perspectives.

For the purposes of my discussion in this section, I confine my focus to two of these dimensions only: (1) the notion of cosmopolitanism as an attitude or a quality manifested in people’s attitudes and orientations, and (2) the notion of cosmopolitanism as a moral and ethical standpoint. I focus on these two dimensions because of the proliferation of (and intertwining between) these two interpretations in the literature. For example, Held (1995, 2000), Beck (1999, 2000b, 2001, 2002), Delanty (2000: 51–67) and Giddens (1998) – to name just a few authors – refer to ‘cosmopolitan nation’, ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ or ‘cosmopolitan society’ and ‘cosmopolitan perspective’ both as descriptive terms (i.e. terms that describe current reality) and as prescriptive terms (i.e. terms that denote theoretical perspectives and/or proposed public policy strategies for the 21st century). In so doing, they engage in the process of simultaneously assessing a pervasive feature of modern life and proposing ways policy-makers (and sociologists) should deal with this reality.

Ulrich Beck’s interpretation provides perhaps the most suitable example. For Beck (2002: 17), ‘cosmopolitanization means internal globalization, globalization from within the national societies’. That is, cosmopolitanization brings forth the pluralization of borders, whereby the simple fact that two individuals live in the same state does not necessarily mean the same social borders bind them, that they inhabit the same ‘life-world’. On the contrary, people from within the same state can inhabit markedly different ‘life-worlds’ and be closer to or farther from people who live outside the borders of the state they live in.

In accordance with this formulation, then, Beck (2000b: 96–7) considers many features of contemporary transnationalism – such as dual citizenship, transnational criminal activity, transnational ways of life, transnational news coverage, or mobility – as indicators of cosmopolitanization. Cosmopolitanization leads Beck (2000b: 100; 2002) to propose an ideal type of a cosmopolitan society – a deterritorialized society, defined by the processes of cosmopolitanization as well as by its own reflexive cosmopolitanism, and ‘a society in which cosmopolitan values rate more highly than national values’.
Beck moves back and forth between sociological description and prescriptive moral argument; this does not allow for an effective conceptual separation between cosmopolitanism as a moral or ethical standpoint and cosmopolitanism as a real, empirical variable. To put it differently, a society of cosmopolitan values is an ethical or moral goal, while cosmopolitan attitudes should be measurable, observable phenomena.8

As a practical matter, the positive correlation between transnationalization and cosmopolitan attitudes is not the only conceivable outcome: on the contrary, other groups that move across national borders – such as refugees, transmigrants, illegal immigrants or international students – are not necessarily cosmopolitan in orientation.9 Beck (2002) is aware that postulating such a simple linear relationship is factually incorrect – he coins the term ‘cosmopolitan fallacy’ to refer to such a misinterpretation. He points out that ‘the fundamental fact that the experiential space of the individual no longer coincides with national space, but is being subtly altered by the opening to cosmopolitanization, should not deceive anyone into believing that we are all going to become cosmopolitans’ (Beck, 2002: 29). Hence, Beck acknowledges that a ‘cosmopolitan society means cosmopolitan society and its enemies’ (Beck, 2000b: 100; emphasis in the original).

But accepting such a dialectical perspective does not resolve the underlying contradiction. This contradiction is twofold: (1) Beck is simultaneously employing cosmopolitanism both as a process and as an outcome, and (2) he intertwines cosmopolitanism and transnationalism. This intertwining takes two forms. First, Beck is using indicators of transnationalism under the heading of cosmopolitanization – thereby implying a positive correlation between the mere presence of transnational activities and the process of cosmopolitanization. Second, at times he is suggesting that the two terms are interchangeable. For example, he writes: ‘Social structure is becoming transnational or cosmopolitan’ (Beck, 2002: 29). In Beck’s (1999, 2000b, 2002) discussions, this positive correlation between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism is quietly assumed as a practical matter when it comes to descriptive aspects of cosmopolitanization. But, then, this very same relationship is explicitly negated when it comes to the discussion of what Robbins (1998: 3) refers to as ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ – that is, the reality of cosmopolitan attitudes as manifested in people’s opinions, attitudes, values and orientation.

Beck’s intertwining between transnationalization and cosmopolitanization contributes to the slippery slope whereby the theorists’ prescriptive statements are interwoven with sociological description. This is because Beck uses ‘cosmopolitanization’ to refer to the process of opening the physical and metaphorical borders of the nation-state while simultaneously designating the society that is the product of this transformation as ‘cosmopolitan’. In the logical structure of the argument, what appears initially as the explanandum
– cosmopolitan society as the outcome of some historical process – is progressively transformed into the *explanans*: it is cosmopolitanization that explains the changing nature of social life in late or second modernity.10

Perhaps Beck could salvage the argument by pointing out the dual nature of cosmopolitanization. That is, just as with other sociological concepts (like secularization and globalization), cosmopolitanization is a transformation that leads to the emergence of a cosmopolitan society (as well as its conceptual opposite). But that cannot be the case, for Beck means different things by the terms 'cosmopolitanization' and 'cosmopolitan society'. The former is a patchwork of elements of globalization and transnationalism.11 The latter is a society that embodies a specific value orientation. By using the same word to designate both entities Beck allows his own commitment to cosmopolitan values to determine his interpretation.12

The Consequences of Glocalization: Transnational Social Spaces, Fields and Networks

To rectify this confusion between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, it is necessary to define the terms in a way that avoids invoking the same concept both as an *explanans* and an *explanandum*. To accomplish such a goal requires three steps: (1) identifying the set of social processes responsible for undermining the boundaries of the nation-state; (2) designating the emerging reality of living in a world where social life consists of structured relationships that extend beyond national borders; and (3) outlining the subsequent qualitative features that can be observed in individual attitudes as a result of the new reality. As Beck (2002) himself acknowledges, the first set of processes is what is referred to as globalization (Robertson, 1992) or 'glocalization' (Roudometof, 2003), or in Beck's own words, 'internal globalization'. Beck's concept of 'internal globalization' is meant to highlight the reality of micro-globalization (Knorr Cetina, 2003), the fact that globalization is not a macro-concept that can only be accounted for through references to large structures. On the contrary, globalization is present in everyday life, at the micro-level (for examples, see Helvacioglu, 2000; Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002; Salamandra, 2002). In my view, there is very little to be gained from employing the word 'cosmopolitanization' to refer to these processes – on the contrary, its employment generates additional confusion in a field already crowded with vague terminology.

The emerging reality of social life under conditions of internal globalization or glocalization is what should be properly understood as transnationalism. Transnationalism is an emergent property that is born out of internal globalization. It does not refer to qualitative feelings or attitudes of individuals, and it is not affected by what people think of it. As Beck suggests,
transnationalism is not restricted to immigrant groups. To capture the reality of transnationalism it might be useful to employ the metaphors of spatiality (Urry, 2000). The use of space as a metaphor for capturing the reality of transnationalism is but an outgrowth of the earlier 'container' theory of the nation-state (Beck, 2000a, 2000b, 2001). In pre-global sociology, a 'society' was conceived of as an entity contained within the boundaries of the nation-state, as if the real boundaries of the state were constructing a social space of interaction and sociability for its citizens (Touraine, 2003). The nation-state was the 'box' that contained a 'society'. This vision of 'society' reverses the reality of nation-state building; state control over boundaries is a feature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the universalization of passport controls and other surveillance mechanisms through which states were able to effectively police their borders is a 20th-century phenomenon (Torpey, 2000). Transnationalism came into existence at that moment in time when successful nation-state building 'contributed to the creation of large numbers of people “out of place” – that is, crossing over the national boundaries erected in the last two centuries' (Roudometof, 2000: 367).

To go beyond the conventional understanding of transnationalism as a facet of international migration, it is necessary to conceptualize transnational interactions as taking place among people and institutions in two or more separate 'containers' or nation-states. Internal globalization is the process of creating the room or the space for these interactions; that is, internal globalization provides the preconditions, the material and non-material infrastructure for the emerging spaces of human interaction. The resulting reality is transnational social spaces (Beck, 2000a) – spaces that, by definition, cannot be restricted to transnational labour markets (Portes, 2000). On the contrary, they can extend into other spaces, including spaces of transnational sexuality, popular music, journalism, as well as spaces fostering the construction of a multitude of identities (ranging from those based on gender to those based on race, religion, or ethnicity). Hence, the notion of transnational social space is considerably broader than the concept of transnational communities.

Transnational social spaces are constructed through the accelerated pace of transnational practices that become routine practices in social life. Such practices do not necessarily involve international migration. On the contrary, transnational interactions involve such routines as international calls, faxes, emails, satellite TV broadcasting, simultaneous media access through Internet sources and TV stations, international conferences, the different varieties of international tourism (ranging from recreational tourism to sex tourism or eco-tourism), as well as the everlasting formalized agreements and ongoing negotiations of a wide array of international organizations and non-governmental groups. The list is far from exhaustive, but it clearly shows that the range of transnational practices involves a rich tapestry encompassing a bewildering array of activities. Not all these activities are formalized. Some
of them might be fleeting or relatively inconsequential to the parties involved, while others might be of paramount importance to all (or some) of the parties.

However, the order of magnitude of such relations changes dramatically in cases where we are dealing with long-term relationships that involve people who come from different countries, might be of different ethnic or racial backgrounds and might even speak different languages. In such cases, relations and transnational interactions become part of larger and more enduring structures – and hence, the necessity for states worldwide to institute provisions governing the status of spouses who are not members of a specific nation-state. For example, in cases of cross-national marriages, the actors involved, the state agencies that have jurisdiction (and hence power) over them, non-state agents (such as attorneys or priests) and international agencies (such as different UN-sponsored organizations) are all involved in a web of interactions and relations. Such relations are far from egalitarian because state agencies have – at least in theory – power over their own nationals, and sometimes they might even favour their own nationals over other parties. For example, German courts have often privileged the rights of German parents over the rights of US parents in custody disputes involving mixed German–US couples.

In these (and numerous other) instances, the recurrent and formally organized transnational practices are not simply interactions within transnational spaces. These practices involve power relations and hence they might be conceptualized as transnational social fields. While transnational social fields pertain to the relations between individuals, organizations and agencies, the people who are thus connected are not necessarily themselves transnational. For example, attorneys involved in a child custody case between US and German parents are part of a transnational field but they might not have to even step outside the borders of their respective states.

Finally, there is the conventional interpretation of transnationalism with respect to the transnational networks formed by immigrants. In this case, the transnational networks are constructed by groups of people who live across state borders. As I have already mentioned, these transnational networks encompass areas of activity that might include transnational entrepreneurs and managers (Portes, 2000), but they might also include musical subcultures or publishing or academic activities or other forms of international organizations that operate across borders (McNeely, 1995; Meyer et al., 1997; see also the essays in Kennedy and Roudometof, 2002).

Transnational social fields are considerably broader than transnational networks of immigrants or other groups of transnational people. Groups of immigrants in conflict with each other might be located within the same transnational social field – but this does not imply that the transnational field is by any means identical to the transnational networks of these immigrants.
For example, Macedonian and Greek immigrants in Australia have formed transnational social networks that connect them to the Macedonian and Greek nation-states. However, both groups are locked into a conflict with each other over the monopolization of the label ‘Macedonian’ on behalf of each group (Danforth, 2000; Roudometof, 2002). Their transnational struggle takes place within a transnational social field that extends beyond Australia’s boundaries and includes the Greek, Macedonian and Bulgarian nation-states as well as international human rights organizations and conferences. But none of this means that these immigrants form a single transnational network; on the contrary, each national group is connected with its own nation-state through churches, associations and other forms of social activism.

Glocalization and Cosmopolitanism: Towards an Operationalization

In the argument presented thus far, the growth of transnational social spaces, social fields and networks is born out of increasing internal globalization or glocalization. Living in a transnational world, individuals can adopt an open, encompassing attitude or a closed, defensive posture. In the first case, individuals are labelled cosmopolitans; while in the second case they are labelled locals (Hannerz, 1990, 1996). These attitudes can be extremely influential in a whole array of topics, ranging from terms of trade to support for fundamentalist organizations to attitudes about religion or culture to expressions of tolerance or hostility towards immigrants (Beyer, 1994; Robertson, 1992; Tomlinson, 1999; Beck, 2001; Barber, 1995; Giddens, 2000).

In other words, the presence of a cosmopolitan outlook (or that of its conceptual opposite, that of a local outlook) is conceptually distinct from the transnational experience. After all, internal globalization means that large numbers of people around the globe are exposed to other cultures on a daily basis without crossing borders on a regular basis, simply through the variety of communication media (including satellite broadcasting, radio and other forms of communication). Furthermore, they might encounter immigrants, refugees, or tourists in their own locality. They might also encounter cultural artefacts and commercial establishments that bring other cultures into close proximity to their own – a process referred to in contemporary debates as ‘McDonaldization’ or ‘Americanization’ or, more broadly, as ‘cultural imperialism’ (Ritzer, 2000; Barber, 1995; Watson, 1997; Epitropoulos and Roudometof, 1998; Tomlinson, 1999).

I would therefore suggest that the degree to which cosmopolitanism is related to the presence or absence of transnational experience is a relationship that can be (and should be) considered an open-ended question. In order to be in a position to contemplate ‘the cosmopolitan and its enemies’ (Beck,
the two concepts should be conceptualized in a manner that preserves clarity of definition. They should not be blended, and the one should not be confused with or reduced to the other.\textsuperscript{14}

While moral entrepreneurs and policy-makers might wish to represent cosmopolitans and locals as discontinuous variables, as an ‘either/or’ choice, reality is far more complex than such a caricature. It is entirely possible that individuals are not going to develop profiles that will conform to the stereotypes of cosmopolitan and local. As a matter of fact, there might be several different topics – ranging from religion to politics or attitudes towards immigration – where considerable inter-state variation might occur.

There is a tendency to oppose ‘thin/cool’ cosmopolitanism-as-detachment to rooted cosmopolitanism (see Stevenson, 2002: para. 5.3). The former presupposes an ironic form of distance from current cultural attachments,\textsuperscript{15} while the latter sees no necessary contradiction between feelings of loyalty and commitment to particular cultures and openness towards difference and otherness.\textsuperscript{16} The moral advocacy of rooted cosmopolitanism rests on the proposition that patriotism (or attachment to the nation or state) does not necessarily imply ethnocentrism. That is, ethnocentrism is a quality that should be conceptually linked to locals, who are expected to adopt the viewpoint of unconditional support for one’s country, putting one’s country first and protecting national interest irrespective of whether their own position is morally superior or not. On the contrary, cosmopolitans are unlikely to support such attitudes; but their negation of ethnocentrism does not mean that they are not good patriots (the Vietnam experience is a case in point). Cosmopolitanism should not be confused with the negation of national identity – and vice versa: localism is different from nationalism.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, successful operationalizations of the two concepts should not commit this fallacy. But, there is no reason to assume that the only way to do so is to negate the very possibility of cosmopolitanism-as-detachment.

Methodologically speaking, Hannerz’s (1990) stress on ‘openness’ does contain a contextual bias.\textsuperscript{18} If not solely context-bound, ‘openness’ requires a more rigorous operationalization. In such a case, the features of cosmopolitans and locals are clusters of attitudes or predispositions rather than sheer contextual or situational ‘openness’. Underlying this approach is the issue of attachment to specific places, institutions, locales, traditions and so on: the cosmopolitan (or local) is the person whose attitudes are more (or less) ‘open’ towards the world; that is, she or he is less (or more) ‘bound’ by territorial and cultural attachments.

Such a conceptualization might appear at first glance as contrary to Tomlinson’s (1999: 194–207) notion of glocalized cosmopolitanism, whereby the contemporary cosmopolitan is conceived as a person able to transcend the global–local opposition, and to live in a global cultural universe (see also Szerszynski and Urry, 2002: 471–3; Urry, 2002: 133–8). The notion of
glocality is meant to transcend the binary opposition between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ and to provide an accurate linguistic representation of their blending in real life (Robertson, 1994; for examples, see Roudometof, 2003: 50–3; Urry, 2002: 83–9). Its theoretical equivalent in the contemporary discourse on cosmopolitanism is the conceptualization of cosmopolitans and locals as distinct, discontinuous variables: all cosmopolitans have to adhere to a single ideal set out in opposition to an ideal held out by the locals.

Tomlinson (1999) correctly points out the possibility of a glocalized blend between the two. But I would suggest that operationalizing cosmopolitans and locals in terms of degrees of attachment is in fact consistent with the fundamental premise of globalization – the theoretical and empirical possibility that individuals might not be consistent in their advocacy of such ideals, but that they might be displaying different degrees of such attitudes, and that the structure of their attitudes might be influenced by a variety of other factors. Hence, the specification of a continuum that consists of different degrees of attachment allows the researcher to view cosmopolitan and local predispositions as relationships of degree, and not as absolutes. Moreover, it allows reserving judgement about outcomes: no a priori decisions are made about the validity of such a conceptualization.

Theoretically speaking, the issue is whether a majority (or even a minority) of the public can be located consistently across such a continuum of attitudes. There are two distinct images of globalization associated with each potential outcome. The first image of globalization (and the one invoked in the common sense employment of the word) is that of transference or exchange of things across boundaries. If there is no coherence among the continuum’s dimensions, this is consistent with a state-centred model of globalization, whereby, despite the high volumes of inter-state exchanges, ‘this system as well as the units remain identical with themselves throughout the globalizing process’ (Bartelson, 2000: 184). In other words, the state or the national society remains the key factor influencing the public’s stance; including the extent of openness towards the world that lies ‘outside’ the nation’s borders. No correlation among the different dimensions of the continuum means that it is not meaningful to speak of a single, transnational, universalized version of cosmopolitanism (and localism). Rather, such an outcome is consistent with the various streams of glocalized cosmopolitanisms (variously referred to as ‘situated’, ‘rooted’, ‘vernacular’ and so on) (Tomlinson, 1999; Pollock et al., 2000; Szerszynski and Urry, 2002).

The second image of globalization is that of a process of transformation (Albrow, 1997), whereby changes affect both the level of the ‘system’ (e.g. world or the globe) as well as each of the units (e.g. states). In such a case, ‘globalization takes place over and above the units as a result of interaction between systemic variables across different dimensions and sectors of that system. Thus, globalization is by definition a multidimensional process that
takes place outside in’ (Bartelson, 2000: 187). This second image of globalization is in fact consistent with the working hypothesis of a cosmopolitan–local continuum. For, in this case, one would expect a polarization of individual attitudes across state boundaries; after all, the argument is that such a polarization is but a consequence of internal globalization as experienced around the globe. However, it is important to note that approaching the cosmopolitan–local problematique in terms of a continuum does not prevent the empirical falsification of the working hypothesis.

Consequently, at the global level, the hypothesis I wish to put forth is that cosmopolitans and locals occupy the opposite ends of a continuum consisting of various forms of attachment. This is conceptually distinct from situated or context-specific versions of cosmopolitanism, whereby cosmopolitanism is a quality that emerges at the state or societal level out of the construction of transnational social fields (e.g. permanent, enduring structures of interaction among inhabitants of different states). In order to contrast cosmopolitanism-as-detachment against rooted or situational cosmopolitanism, it is necessary to compare cosmopolitanism at the global level against cosmopolitanism at the state level. In my opinion, this is a methodologically unsound comparison. The existence of ‘thin/cool’ cosmopolitanism at the global level does not imply the absence of rooted cosmopolitanism within specific countries or regions.

Contemporary research has actually yielded results suggesting that attachment to locality is consequential in terms of openness towards outsiders. In his analysis of data from the Australian census, Phillips (2002: 614) found that divergent modes of geographic identification are associated with significantly different levels of acceptance towards outsiders: ‘locals’ were far less accepting towards outsiders. Even Szerszynski and Urry (2002: 469), who advocate a nationalized or context-specific model of cosmopolitanism, admit the presence of the ‘thin/cool’ version of cosmopolitanism in their research results: ‘We found a widespread if rather general cosmopolitanism’, they write (Szerszynski and Urry, 2002: 472).

For analytical purposes (and for those purposes alone), it is necessary to conceptualize the cosmopolitan–local continuum, as if locals and cosmopolitans were groups of people with opposite, conflicting visions. In other words, the two ends of the continuum are viewed as ‘ideal types’ (not stereotypes). But, then, it is necessary to specify those dimensions where it would be reasonable to expect that these two groups would display conflicting visions and priorities. Cosmopolitans and locals are defined in terms of clusters of attitudes and predispositions; it is a foregone conclusion that very few would display all the characteristics, but what is important is whether such characteristics correlate with each other and whether individual attitudes are indeed clustered around the ideal types at the two ends of the continuum. If the characteristics do not correlate with each other and the individual attitudes
are not clustered around the ideal types, then the twin concepts cannot be universally defined (and therefore, glocalized cosmopolitanisms are the only methodologically viable ones). If the characteristics do correlate with each other and the individual attitudes are clustered around the ideal types, then there is evidence that the polarization of attitudes among the public is not a working hypothesis, but an empirical proposition.

Because the dimensions of the continuum are conceived as relationships of degree (e.g. continuous variables), the structuration and consistency of opinions and attitudes become an empirical question, and not a theoretical, a priori decision. The visions and priorities where it would be reasonable to expect locals and cosmopolitans to hold out different views refer to several important dimensions of social life. These include attachment to locales, states or countries, local cultures and the national economy. Accordingly, then, the dimensions of the cosmopolitan–local continuum take the form of different degrees of attachment to specific locales, countries, local cultures and communities, and finally, to the ‘national economy’. It is a foregone conclusion that different individuals’ sentiments would vary depending upon the particular dimension they feel is most important for themselves and others. The following description offers a brief sketch for an operationalization of the cosmopolitan–local continuum. Specifically, the continuum between locals and cosmopolitans might vary with respect to the following dimensions.

First, cosmopolitans and locals diverge with respect to the degree of attachment to a locality (neighbourhood or city). Cosmopolitans have a low degree of such attachment and locals have a high degree of such attachment. Contemporary cultural theorists (Appadurai, 1995, 1996; Hannerz, 1996; Basch et al., 1994) have pointed out the extent to which locality is becoming differentiated from a physical place. Although transmigrants or transnational peoples provide the paradigmatic case of individuals who experience such a separation between ‘homeland’ and the place where they live, this experience is not necessarily restricted to these groups. Nor is there any reason to assume that it is only those who cross state borders who are susceptible to such a rift.

Second, cosmopolitans and locals diverge with respect to the degree of attachment to a state or country. Locals are likely to value being a native of their country, having the country’s citizenship and having a sense of belonging to the country’s dominant national group. Cosmopolitans are likely not to value these attributes. This dimension highlights the degree to which cosmopolitans and locals adopt different postures when it comes to reconfiguration of state sovereignty. Citizenship has been traditionally interpreted as closely connected to formal membership in a state, and, in most cases, such membership is justified through inclusion to the dominant national or ethnic group or by birth. The decoupling of citizenship from its traditional
association with the nation-state is a feature observed in numerous analyses, whereby theorists detect a trend towards ‘post-national’ membership to the state (Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996; Delanty, 2000). However, these attitudes should not be confused with the negation of a specific national identity.

Third, cosmopolitans and locals diverge with respect to the degree of attachment to and support of local culture. Obviously, such an attachment and support for local culture are likely to take a variety of different forms depending upon the specifics of different national cultures around the globe. Religion, language and other cultural characteristics invariably would be relevant as indicators of attachment and support to a local culture. Also, such indicators are likely to fluctuate depending upon the regional and national differences of particular nation-states. For example, religion serves as an important marker for national identity in several European states, ranging from Poland to Greece or Ireland.

Irrespective of such cases of national variation, however, locals should value cultural membership to the nation – and cosmopolitans oppose it – since, by definition, such membership excludes people on the basis of ascribed criteria. By and large, locals are more ethnocentric than cosmopolitans. For example, cosmopolitans do not endorse the uncritical pursuit of national interest – even if this leads to conflict with other nations. On the contrary, locals are likely to express their attitudes along the lines of the age-old slogan ‘my country right or wrong’. As I have already mentioned, this difference cannot be reduced to a simple issue of greater or lesser degrees of nationalism, because nationalism is considerably broader than ethnocentrism.

Fourth, cosmopolitans and locals diverge with respect to the degree of economic, cultural and institutional protectionism. Support for such protectionism varies widely depending upon the specific problems faced by nation-states worldwide. For example, anti-globalization rhetoric in the US leads to arguments in favour of institutional protectionism in a variety of fields, while, in Europe, similar rhetoric identifies globalization with Americanization. Going beyond the rhetoric, however, locals and cosmopolitans display different attitudes when it comes to pragmatic issues such as support for tariffs, prohibition of land ownership by foreigners, opposition to or support of international interventions and willingness to move for reasons of work or for obtaining more favourable living conditions.

**Conclusions**

In this essay, I have tried to clarify the relationship between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. Both terms are frequently evoked in sociological description and even everyday speech. It is important to note that these terms
are not exclusively sociological concepts but also common-sense concepts. Hence, I argue that our understanding of these terms is coloured by considerations of status, national origin, ethnicity, race and gender. While contemporary discourse has focused attention on the relationship between transnationalism and international migration, I argue that this interpretation is unduly restrictive.

Transnationalism involves three different layers of activities, each of which entails different degrees of structuration with regard to the permanence of the transnational practices performed by actors. First, there are the transnational social spaces, which are constructed through the recurrent transnational interactions and practices of actors worldwide. Such spaces involve a wide range of activities, but these activities might range from the trivial to the deadly serious. Second, the more structured and permanent interactions and practices that take place in transnational social space involve the exercise of power relations by a multitude of agents and actors. These more structured practices take place within transnational social fields, fields that connect people and institutions from different countries across the globe. Transnational mobility is not a prerequisite for participating in such a field. Third, there are transnational communities, communities constructed by new immigrants in advanced industrialized countries, but also communities constructed by other professional or managerial groups that routinely cross the globe.

The proliferation of the different levels of transnationalism around the globe leads to a bifurcation of attitudes among the public. Faced with the reality of transnational experience, members of the public might opt for an open attitude welcoming the new experiences or they might opt for a defensive closed attitude seeking to limit the extent to which transnational social spaces penetrate their cultural milieu. In the first instance, we speak of cosmopolitans, while in the second instance we speak of locals. However, instead of thinking of these two categories as discontinuous variables, I suggest that most people are likely to develop highly complex attitudes with regard to the two alternatives, and, therefore, it is better to conceptualize the two categories as forming a single continuum. Individuals might take different positions within this continuum, but their choices should vary along several dimensions that dictate the basic features of the two categories.

Moreover, the sheer operationalization of the cosmopolitan–local relationship in terms of a continuum does not negate the possibility of glocalized cosmopolitanism, whereby individuals can combine both global and local forms of identity. In such a case, the dimensions of the continuum will not cluster along the two ends, but they would vary solely based upon regional or state-specific factors. Ultimately, even the existence of universalized, ‘cool/thin’ cosmopolitanism does not necessarily exclude the possibility of rooted or context-specific cosmopolitanisms. The former emerge at the
global level while the latter emerge out of specific national contexts, as transnational social fields modify them. Whether the strength of such fields is capable of producing an independent globe-wide effect not reduced to state- or context-specific factors becomes an empirical question.

The cosmopolitan–local continuum is defined as a cluster of several dimensions. These dimensions include the degree of attachment to a locality (neighbourhood or city); the degree of attachment to a state or country; the degree of attachment to and support of local culture; and finally, the degree of economic, cultural and institutional protectionism. Cosmopolitans and locals are likely to adopt contrasting points of view with regard to the above choices; however, they might or might not be consistent in their preferences. For example, some might support local culture but be opposed to forms of economic protectionism. Examining the factors responsible for variations of attitudes is a matter that clearly falls outside the scope of the discussion here.

While some transnationals might be predisposed towards cosmopolitanism, others might be predisposed towards localism. The experience of 9/11 should make abundantly clear that it is at best naive to assume that the presence of cosmopolitanism as an attitude is a quality that follows logically or inexorably from the very existence of the transnational experience. The relationship between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism is not a linear one whereby greater transnationalization leads to greater cosmopolitanization. On the contrary, the geographical extension of transnational social spaces into the global cultural milieu is responsible for producing both cosmopolitan and local attitudes. Making a choice between the two is a matter of ethics and moral judgement, but this judgement should stand independently from our ability to describe the conceptual alternatives.

Beck’s (2000b: 100) call for a reopening of the intellectual debate on the relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism is a fruitful contribution to the dilemmas of contemporary nation-states. His advocacy of ‘cosmopolitan society’ or ‘cosmopolitan nation’ where the ideals of cosmopolitanism gain the upper hand against local ethnocentrism is indeed consistent (and not antithetical) with civic and more democratically orientated conceptualizations of nationalism (or patriotism). Reviving such notions does provide an alternative political solution to waves of anti-immigrant ethnocentric protests sweeping European Union states. But this should not be confused with the reality of cosmopolitanism – the only way to accurately measure the success (or failure) of cosmopolitan values is to clearly separate our moral advocacy of them from cosmopolitan (and local) attitudes as observable phenomena.
Notes

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1 The word ‘cosmopolitan’ is an English (and French) rendition of the Greek word *kosmo-połite*, a compound noun that literally means ‘the citizen [politis] of the world [cosmos]’. See Cheah (1998: 22) and Delanty (2000) for brief reviews of the word’s etymology.

2 In his short essay, ‘The Great Return’ (2002), Milan Kundera describes the tale of a couple that illustrates this labelling process. Irena, a Czech exile living in Paris, and Gustaf, her Swedish friend, are involved in navigating their connections to place, locale and their multiple identities as Parisians, transnationals, cosmopolitans, refugees and so on. While both of them live in a country and a city outside their own nation-state and even speak to each other in a language other than their native tongue, their experiences are not conceived as identical. Irena recounts that Gustaf ‘was seeing her exactly the way everyone else saw her: a young woman in pain, banished from her country’ (Kundera, 2002: 100; emphasis in the original). This is an extension of Irena’s original status as a refugee who fled Communist Prague and sought shelter and a better future in Paris. In contrast, Gustaf, her friend and lover, ‘comes from a Swedish town he wholeheartedly detests, and in which he refuses to set foot. But in his case it’s taken for granted. Because everyone applauds him as a nice, very cosmopolitan Scandinavian who’s already forgotten all about the place he comes from. Both of them are pigeonholed, labeled, and they will be judged by how true they are to their labels’ (Kundera, 2002: 100; emphasis in the original).

3 Race is perhaps the most visible marker involved in such labelling. Iyer (2000: 134–6) recounts an encounter with a television executive, an English-speaking Canadian citizen, one of those ‘refugees’ who ‘fled’ to Toronto in the aftermath of the 1980s Francophone nationalist campaign in Quebec. Not being able to place his accent, Iyer discovers that the executive’s parents were Hungarian Jews who survived the Holocaust. Escaping persecution both by the Nazis and, later on, by the Soviets, his family settled in Montreal, where, by virtue of being affiliated with the Anglophones, he was forced to move yet once more from Montreal to Toronto. Upon recounting these details, Iyer (2000: 135) remarks: ‘He looked so much like my image of a classic Canadian that I realized, with a start, all the stories that I was missing, and all the pressures that an “invisible minority” suffers in part because they’re not written on his face; few people would extend to him the kind of allowances they might to a newcomer from Kigali or New Delhi.’

4 The concept’s original application was restricted to recent US immigrants (Basch...
et al., 1994). In this respect, contemporary research remains bound by traditional stereotypes, the very same stereotypes according to which Kundera’s heroes are judged (for a critique, see Dominguez, 1998). By and large, non-immigrants or denizens (such as tourists, musicians, actors, doctors, professors, corporate managers and so on) are much more likely to be viewed as ‘nice cosmopolitans’ rather than simply transnational people.

5 For the French philosophers of the Enlightenment, a cosmopolitan was a citizen of the world, a universal humanist who transcended particularistic distinctions based on territory, language, or culture (Schlereth, 1977). See the essays in Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann (1997) for Kant’s original formulation of the cosmopolitan ideal. See Cheah (1998) for a discussion that traces the evolution of the term’s meaning from Kant to Marx.

6 Moreover, the notion of cosmopolitanism as embedded into the western discourse since Kant, is similarly questioned by those who argue that contemporary researchers should pay closer attention to the non-western historical and cultural context, and the ways different versions of cosmopolitanism have been articulated outside the western cultural milieu (Pollock et al., 2000; Holton, 2002).

7 For example, Zubaida (1999) notes that cosmopolitanism is a term that can be applied to places, cultural milieus and religions. The relationship between cosmopolitan attitudes and the urban setting also suggests the necessity to consider the different varieties of cosmopolitanism throughout world history and across cultural contexts (Featherstone, 2002: 2). See also Holton (2002) for a penetrating analysis arguing that cosmopolitanism grows out of particular locations in time and space, rather than emerging from free-floating moral philosophy.

8 For example, Held (2000: 402) writes that the cosmopolitan project argues that in the 21st century ‘each citizen of a state will have to learn to become a “cosmopolitan citizen” as well: that is, a person capable of mediating between national traditions, communities of fate, and alternative styles of life’. His formulation makes abundantly clear that a specific orientation at the individual level is a prerequisite for an effective cosmopolitan public policy.

9 ‘A true cosmopolitan’, Iyer (2000: 210) reminds us, ‘is not someone who has traveled a lot so much as someone who can appreciate what it feels like to be the Other.’ Some of the September 11 hijackers were, after all, ‘international students’.

10 Rosenberg (2000) has developed a similar critique of various globalization theories. As he points out, ‘globalization as an outcome cannot be explained simply by invoking globalization as a process tending towards that outcome’ (Rosenberg, 2000: 2).

11 Beck’s (2002: 29–30) cosmopolitanization means ‘that the key questions of a way of life, nourishment, production, identity, fear, memory, pleasure, fate, can no longer be located nationally or locally, but only globally or glocally’. In other words, the dynamic conception of cosmopolitanism is a combination of internal globalization or glocalization and transnationalism.

12 This inconsistent use of the concept is but a rationalization of the intellectuals’ own position. For such a position allows the fortunate members of the international academic jet set to simultaneously experience both transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. Intellectuals often employ such metaphors in order to cast themselves into a privileged position that allows them to speak on behalf of the
excluded while also maintaining a relatively affluent lifestyle (Pels, 1999: 72). Hence, their fascination for and endorsement of cosmopolitanism is an extension of the marginal status (and the privileged position) inscribed in the very concept itself. None of this casts doubt on the reality of cosmopolitanism or transnationalism – but Pels’ comments should caution against what is an all too natural (for academics) trend of assuming a positive correlation between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism.

13 The initial application of the concept of transnational social field comes from the field of international migration (see Smith and Guarnizo, 1998). In contrast to transnational social fields, transnational social spaces can be conceived of as consisting of flows (Urry, 2000) of human interactivity. If relations in transnational social spaces are free-floating, relationships in social fields are far more structured, more ‘solid’ and less ‘fluid’. Robertson (1992) has put forward the notion of ‘global field’, but by that, he refers to global structuration. The properties of the global field are those concepts that are relativized by globalization. The relativization of the relations between the individual and the nation-state is but an aspect of the broader process of globalization. The construction of transnational social fields (as well as transnational social spaces) is an important facet of the overall process. Nevertheless, it is clear that Robertson’s global field is a concept considerably broader than that of the transnational social field.

14 For example, Szerszynski and Urry (2002: 470) include extensive mobility and the capacity to consume many places and environments en route among the basic features of cosmopolitanism. These are features of transnationalism – and the authors employ ‘the right to “travel” corporeally, imaginatively, and virtually’ as a means for bridging the divide between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism.

15 Turner (2002) suggests that cosmopolitan virtue requires Socratic irony, by which some can gain some distance from the polity. Turner considers detachment to be a critical ingredient of cosmopolitanism but he adds ‘cosmopolitanism does not mean that one does not have a country or a homeland, but one has to have a certain reflexive distance from that homeland’ (Turner, 2002: 57).

16 Szerszynski and Urry (2002: 469) argue that ‘openness’ should not imply that the cosmopolitan is a specific cultural type that can be defined outside a specific context. Rather, the ‘cosmopolitan’ is an empty signifier that can be filled with specific, and often rather different content, in different cultural worlds (see also Pollock et al., 2000; Holton, 2002).

17 During the post-1870 period, the golden period of nation-state building in Europe (Hobsbawm, 1990), nation-state building reconfigured the meaning of cosmopolitanism in a manner inconsistent with nationalism. But this connection has been largely destabilized in the post-1945 period, as the accounts of long-distance or transnational nationalism indicate (Danforth, 1995; Basch et al., 1994; Glick Schiller and Fourton, 2001; Anderson, 1993). The movement of peoples has strengthened the tendency of individuals living outside the borders of their national homeland to maintain their ties with their nation and to participate in national projects connected to their nation.

18 In all likelihood, this is a residue of Hannerz’s anthropological training (for a more sociological viewpoint, see Merton’s original formulation of cosmopolitans and locals [Merton, 1968]). This bias leads to serious problems in the operationalization
of the term. Szerszynski and Urry (2002: 470) argue that cosmopolitan predispositions and practices involve curiosity about many places, peoples and cultures, willingness to take risks by virtue of encountering the Other, the ability to map one’s own society and culture on a global level, and semiotic skills for interpreting images of the Other. Al-Qaida members display several of the above features – and this points out the problematic nature of a context-bound definition.

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